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is paper presents a new Key Management and Distribution Scheme
for use in the European Rail Trac Management System (ERTMS).
Its aim is to simplify key management and improve cross-border
operations through hierarchical partitioning. e current scheme
used in ERTMS involves the creation and distribution of 3DES keys
to train and trackside entities, which are then used as part of the Eu-
roRadio Protocol to provide message authentication. is results in
the distribution of tens of thousands of keys using portable media,
a prohibitively high burden on management and resourcing. We
present a symmetric key solution, TRAKS, which has the benet of
being backwards compatible with the current ERTMS standard and
being post-quantum secure. is new scheme reduces the number
of cryptographic keys in circulation, and maintains the current se-
curity model. We achieve this by dynamically deriving unique keys
from a shared secret, i.e. the line secret, which is combined with
IDs of trains, and of signalling equipment. In addition to providing
beer key management, our scheme also adds authentication to
the location data provided by EuroBalises.
CCS CONCEPTS
•Security and privacy → Key management; Hash functions
and message authentication codes; Authorization; Mobile
and wireless security;
1 INTRODUCTION
In any Industrial Control System (ICS) that has safety-critical func-
tionality, it is important for any message to be authenticated in
order to ensure that the message came from a genuine entity who
had appropriate authorisation to send that message, and to detect
malicious modications by an aacker.
e European Rail Trac Management System (ERTMS) is a
safety-critical ICS which provides a suite of protocols used to deliver
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a modern train management and signalling platform1. is standard
is designed with the intention to enable trains to interoperate across
borders and optimise the running operation of railways. At present,
the system is being rolled out across Europe and also on high-
speed lines around the world. ERTMS is dened as a protocol stack
formed of the following three layers: GSM-R [9], EuroRadio and
the Application Layer Protocol. e EuroRadio and the Application
Layer Protocol form ETCS, the European Train Control System [16].
GSM-R, a rail-specic variant of the GSM protocol, is used for
communications between the train and trackside infrastructure
such as radio block controllers (RBCs), i.e. the trackside components
that manage trains in a geographical area. RBCs are responsible for
issuing ‘movement authorities’, messages which permit a train to
move a specic distance at a given speed, and managing safe train
movement in a geographic region of approximately 70km. Trains
periodically provide location updates and the RBC would respond
with an updated movement authority. e EuroRadio protocol layer
provides authentication and integrity of the communication using
cryptographic MACs. Messages which have a valid MAC (or are
from a carefully selected subset of messages that may be sent at a
high priority and not requiring a MAC) are passed to the application
layer. e Application Layer Protocol [6] is a stateful protocol that
denes the ERTMS message standard and additionally implements
checks that help prevent message replays.
EuroBalises are devices placed between the tracks, typically in
groups of two or three, which are read by a train passing over them.
e train trusts the EuroBalise to provide accurate location (rather
than using GPS) and track prole data, which can include speed
limits, gradients and tilt proles. Currently, the balise data is vali-
dated using a CRC code, which is publicly known [21], and is only
for error detection but does not provide any integrity protection.
e current ERTMS standard [18] states that key provisioning
and management should be done based on geographical domains
(e.g. Great Britain), where each domain has a Key Management Cen-
tre (KMC) which is responsible for key generation and management
for that domain. Additionally, the KMC also denes procedures to
install the keys on train on-board units (OBUs) and RBCs. rough-
out the paper we will interchangeably use the terms train and OBU
to refer to trains. e current procedure requires that keys for
an OBU or from an RBC are generated by the KMCs following a
request from a vendor (e.g. Siemens). Aer generation, the keys for
1hp://www.ertms.net
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the requesting OBU or RBC are sent in the clear on portable media
devices [19], to be installed.
is setup is highly inecient; using portable media devices to
move keys greatly increases the risk of compromise, especially due
to the fact that keys on the device are stored in cleartext. Addi-
tionally, this makes deployment and management of keys dicult
(i.e. in order to update a key for an RBC, an engineer needs to phys-
ically travel to the RBC’s location in order to install the key on the
portable media device). Informal discussions with rail systems man-
agers have highlighted that insecure strategies like (i) provisioning
all (OBU, RBC) key pairs to each OBU and RBC, or simply (ii) having
KMCs extend the life of keys when they are due to expire are used
in practice. Cross-border operation is also challenging as keys need
to be shared between geographical domains that are managed by
dierent KMCs. Under the current scheme, additional burden is
placed on the foreign KMC operators (KMC owners who are outside
of the ‘home domain’ that the train is registered). Whenever a new
OBU is to operate in their domain, they are required to establish
the appropriate keys to hand to the ‘home’ KMC, but they also have
to send an engineer to each of their RBCs to install the necessary
keys. In the case of a progressive national deployment, this burden
is high.
ICS environments are also designed with a long lifespan as a
key feature. Any solutions presented must consider issues such as
post-quantum security, where quantum computers could render
some encryption schemes insecure. It should, however, be noted
that there are current eorts by NIST and ETSI to standardise
post-quantum cryptography. e time required to standardise this,
though, is past the intended start of ERTMS national deployment.
For example in the United Kingdom, Crossrail and the East Coast
mainline are expected to be complete by 2021.
In this paper, we give a formal denition of the security of the
ERTMS key generation. We continue by proposing a new key man-
agement scheme for ERTMS comprised of a key generation scheme,
which introduces line secrets to enforce an operational permissions
model, and, when combined with the train ID and RBC ID produces
a key which can be used in the EuroRadio protocol to negotiate
a session key for message MACs, and its corresponding key dis-
tribution protocol. Our solution is backwards-compatible with the
current scheme allowing infrastructure managers to progressively
implement it into the standard.
1.1 Contributions
is paper proposes TRAKS (Train and RBC Authenticated Key
Scheme), a key management scheme for ERTMS. Our main focus
with TRAKS is to reduce the management overhead, i.e. physically
transport keys on portable media devices, an inecient process
which has lead to insecure practices, while maintaining the same
exibility and security for the keys. As such, our contributions are
as follows:
(1) Unied ERTMS Key Management and Distribution
Protocol. e TRAKS key management scheme is de-
signed to generate message authentication keys for com-
munications between OBUs and RBCs, and for communi-
cations between OBU and balises.
(2) Reduced deployment overhead. e TRAKS scheme
provides support for dynamic key generation using pseudo-
random functions (PRFs) and a shared secret. e method
of producing long-term keys removes the need to physi-
cally access RBC aer deployment (RBCs are still provi-
sioned with a secret during deployment).
(3) Backwards compatible andpost-quantumsecure. Our
protocol is designed using symmetric key cryptography in
a way that allows it to be fully backwards compatible with
the current scheme used by ERTMS. is makes it possible
to gradually roll out this scheme in existing systems. Addi-
tionally, TRAKS uses post-quantum secure PRFs to derive
keys.
(4) Security analysis. To our knowledge, we provide the
rst security denition for the key generation protocol in
ERTMS. We also prove that TRAKS is at least as secure as
the current scheme while providing all additional benets
with respect to key management.
Issues with the existing ERTMS scheme and related work are
discussed in Section 2. We then provide a high-level overview
and intuition of the current oine ERTMS scheme and TRAKS
in Section 3. In Section 4, we provide a generic formalism of the
oine ERTMS scheme, followed by our scheme, TRAKS, in Sec-
tion 5. A security analysis is provided in Section 6. We discuss
the key management lifecycle and distribution in Sections 7 and
8 respectively. Example applications of the scheme, showing its
universal application in ERTMS, including EuroBalises (EBs) are
presented in Section 9, and we conclude in Section 10.
2 BACKGROUND AND RELATEDWORK
Currently, ERTMS Key Management is dened as two standards,
one oine, and a proposed online scheme [19, 20]. Some past work
has looked at ERTMS Key Management, for example in [7, 8], where
ERTMS was taken as a case study in assessing the protection of
critical infrastructure, with an introduction to a proposed ERTMS
key management hierarchy, and study of the use of symmetric and
public key cryptography and their applicability to the problem.
ey advocate symmetric key solutions over public key solutions.
Pe´pin and Viglioi [12] perform an analysis of ERTMS Key Manage-
ment from a cryptographic perspective, identifying that the current
scheme will fail when 3DES may be feasibly broken, but do not
make any recommendations on how to amend the scheme other
than a change in cryptographic algorithms.
Since the development of the oine scheme and the introduction
of the ETCS Level 3 baselines, an online solution has been proposed
in [20]. is involves the introduction of a PKI in which certi-
cates and keys are issued to trains and RBCs, where they can then
communicate with the Key Management Centre. is, however,
relies on the assumption that GSM-R bandwidths are capable of
these communications, and rely on the upgrade to GPRS support,
which is not currently ratied for use in ERTMS. e move to an
online scheme would be disruptive for infrastructure managers.
e only benet of this scheme it is that an engineer does not have
to interact with the train or RBC aer initial setup, with the excep-
tion of maintenance periods. Furthermore, the management of a
large-scale PKI for cross-border operation would become a burden
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as all trains and RBCs will be required to regularly contact all key
management centres they are entitled to use to update their certi-
cates and keys. With the limiting bandwidths available by GSM-R,
this is not a feasible solution, and places signicant overheads on
the train owner and infrastructure manager, especially given the
long lifespan of ERTMS will limit the cryptographic primitives that
can be used. In a post-quantum world, however, with the use of
public-key cryptography dened in [20], the scheme would also
not be secure, as it relies on RSA public key encryption. Both the
oine and PKI-based schemes retain the same key hierarchy, as
presented in Table 1.
Dierent solutions for key management have been proposed
in the literature. For example, Biswas proposes a solution with
multiple two-party keys and one multi-party key, where base and
extended keys are used to exchange keys across a large, static
group [2]. Other schemes, such as the Advanced Access Control
System (AACS) [10], use pseudo-random functions to generate
symmetric keys which are used to derive the necessary keys to
decrypt media content. ese schemes are, however, not directly
applicable to ERTMS, as groups cannot be statically set and they
change over time. e AACS scheme is also establishes long-term
keys for decryption only and not for the authentication of payloads.
Alternative proposals are based on Die-Hellman, which is not
post-quantum secure [11, 15].
Several proposals that have been made by the National Infras-
tructure Managers to specically improve ERTMS key manage-
ment [1, 3, 13], as the current schemes either lacked denition on
key distribution2 or were not suitable for use. In the case of ProRail
and O¨BB, keys are not issued equally, where ProRail tendered a
solution which allowed one train to share the same key with many
RBCs, in addition to the one train sharing a key with exactly one
RBC. For O¨BB, an online scheme was required to distribute keys
with RBCs as no standard was available at the time. ese solu-
tions, however, whilst compliant with the current standard, should
not be deemed secure, as the compromise of one train key would
compromise its communications with all RBCs under that scheme.
Furthermore, the other solutions advocate the use of public key en-
cryption through its use of RSA, which is not post-quantum secure,
with no ratied alternatives for use.
3 ERTMS KEY GENERATION OVERVIEW
Within the current implementation of ERTMS, long-term keys are
installed on RBCs and OBUs, which are used to derive a session key
using exchanged nonces through the EuroRadio protocol [18]. is
session key is used as the MAC key to authenticate and provide
integrity protection of transmied messages. In this section, we
provide an overview of ERTMS and TRAKS Key Generation, before
formally dening these schemes in Section 4.
In the current ERTMS Key Management scheme, the infrastruc-
ture manager allocates a unique key for each RBC-OBU pair. is
key is randomly generated by the Key Management Centre, and
is encrypted and a MAC is computed for this. is setup is pend-
ing changes following a proposed modication which is part of
the ETCS Level 3 baseline standard that introduces a PKI, which
2e SUBSET-114 specications were rst released a number of years aer SUBSET-037
was released
allows the trains and RBCs to communicate directly to the KMC
over TCP/IP.
e existing and proposed parallel scheme carry signicant op-
erational overhead, and both present a security exposure due to
the potential to extend the validity of keys. In our solution, we
oer a fully backwards-compatible scheme, which allows the KMC
to issue keys until such a time that the RBC may be updated to
support dynamic key generation. is reduces the overhead on
national KMC owners, improves interoperability for cross-border
operation, and also reduces the requirement of the home infrastruc-
ture manager to go out into the eld to install keys on the RBCs
for each new entity introduced into the network. Furthermore, the
scheme presented in this paper supports the authentication of data
on EuroBalises (EBs), such as the current location data. Currently
this data is trusted and assumed to be accurate and authentic, but
is sent without any form of authentication.
Security Requirements. Under the existing key key management
scheme, an implicit permissions model exists: a EuroRadio session
cannot be established if there is no cryptographic relationship be-
tween two entities denoted by id and id ′. is is because a key
kmid,id ′ does not exist between them. One benet of this scheme
is that a train cannot be given signalling commands in an area it is
not authorised to operate in. An example aack which is prevented
is GSM relaying, where the train trac is redirected to a distant
GSM Base Station. Without this permissions model (assuming all
keys have been installed), the train would be given the command
to move forward until it has reached a balise to provide its location.
is could place the train in a potentially unsafe situation.
Informal Aacker Model. In our scheme, we investigate aackers
that have the ability to insert keys, intercept keys between the KMC
and Train, and intercept keys between the KMC and RBC.
If an aacker is able to install arbitrary keys onto either the train
or RBC, it can create a state of disassociation between what the
KMC and train/RBC believes is the current set of loaded keys. It
is currently not clear in the ERTMS specications what remedia-
tion should take place if a key is aempted to be installed and one
already exists. In the case of key interception, once the transport
keys, keys which are used to encrypt and provide integrity and
authentication of payloads between train/RBC and KMC, are in-
stalled onto the train or RBC, the aacker is not able to establish
the kmid,id ′ keys unless they know the appropriate secret used to
generate the keys. As the transport keys are installed in plaintext,
an aacker who obtains the transport key at the point of manufac-
ture/commissioning is able to intercept all keys between a train or
RBC.
We therefore consider an aacker from the Dolev-Yao model,
who operates in polynomial time, and is able to monitor communi-
cations between the KMC and any train and RBC. In particular, the
aacker is also able to send arbitrary messages to any given train,
RBC or KMC, and either delay, modify or delete messages being
sent between participants. Any proposed solution has to consider
the capabilities of such an aacker.
ERTMS Parameters. In the ERTMS System Specications [5], iden-
tity variables, known as NID C, are assigned to specic ‘zones’ of
operation, with varying scope, from an entire country to a specic
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ERTMS Entities Handshake MAC Encryption
OBU↔ RBC KMAC KSMAC ×
RBC↔ RBC KMAC KSMAC ×
KMC↔ RBC/OBU × kt1 kt2
KMC↔ KMC × K-KMC1 K-KMC2
Figure 1: Current ERTMS Key Management Hierarchy [17],
showing the specic keys used between ERTMS entitles in
specic applications: session handshake, message authenti-
cation and encryption.
ERTMS Keys Current TRAKS
NID C Secret × knid c
RBC Derivation Key × kmr id,null
Train Key KMACr id,oid kmr id,oid
Balise Secret × km
Balise NID C Area Key × kmNID C,null
Balise MAC Key × kmNID C,bдid
Figure 2: Proposed TRAKS Key Management Hierarchy. We
introduce the new notation used throughout this paper as: a
train with OBU ID 3, communicating with an RBC with ID 5
would have the key kmr id5,oid3. Balise MAC Keys are bound
by the NID C they are located in and their unique balise group
ID, bдid .
line in a country. ese are assigned by a central body, from a pool
of available values. We leverage these variables to dene a per-
missions model of where a train is allowed to operate, rather than
relying on the direct pairing relationship that the current scheme
uses. From this, the infrastructure manager derives a set of keys
that are allocated to RBCs in that specic area identied by an
NID C. If the infrastructure manager is not in a position to support
the full capabilities of dynamic key-derivation at RBC level, they
can use the same functions to generate train keys for a RBC. is
is done by computing the RBC key, and applying this to the set
of train IDs authorised to operate within the NID C. Train IDs and
RBC IDs are allocated by the infrastructure manager from a central
ERTMS ID database, EDB. e result of this process is a set of keys
which are backwards-compatible with the existing ERTMS scheme.
We provide an example application of TRAKS in Section 3.1.
For national infrastructure managers, this reduces the time taken
to allow a train to cross borders, as the pre-requisite step to install
keys on the RBC is no longer required, as the RBC is able to derive
any key required based on the rst EuroRadio message received
by the train (where the train ID is provided). Under this model, we
also enforce a permissions model, whereby, through partitioning of
the rail network, we ensure that keys are not unnecessarily issued,
where the operational zones are exactly dened and controlled.
Trains may also be reallocated to new areas - in the current scheme,
this would rely on an engineer going into the eld to install the
requisite keys on the train and RBCs, however, under our proposed
scheme, TRAKS, this can be managed between the train and key
management centre, with no requirement to interact with the RBC.
Current Key Distribution. Key distribution in ERTMS is currently a
manual process, where keys are generated by the KMC and then
distributed as required in response to a valid request. is set of
keys is then accompanied with a separate MAC and encrypted using
pre-shared symmetric keys referred to as transport keys. When a
new train or RBC is added to the system, however, these transport
keys, used to encrypt and authenticate payloads to and from the
OBU, RBC and KMC, are installed in cleartext. e compromise of
the transport media (e.g. USB stick or CD) would allow an aacker
to forge their own valid messages which could compromise safety.
Under TRAKS, we propose a new key distribution scheme, whereby
trains and RBCs instead generate their own transport keys in such a
way that an external aacker would require knowledge of the keys
in order to obtain the keying material. In our scheme, we propose
a shared key between the key management centre and approved
vendors, which is used for vendor-KMC communications. Trains
and RBCs have a burnt-in key pair, installed by the vendor which
can be used for train/RBC-vendor communications.
In the following we dene a framework for ERTMS key genera-
tion, outlining the functions run by the Key Management Centre.
Using this outline denition, we can dene a model of the current
ERTMS Key Generation scheme in Algorithm 1 and TRAKS in Al-
gorithm 2. Using these models, it is possible to prove the security
of these mathematical models against an aacker, which gives us
condence that our proposed solution does not compromise the
security of ERTMS.
Denition 3.1. An ERTMS key generation scheme KMAC =
(SGen, INIT.ID,GEN.KMAC) over a ERTMS id database EDB is
a tuple of three polynomial-time algorithms:
knid c ← SGen(1λ ) : is a probabilistic key generation algorithm
run by the KMC. It takes as input a security parameter λ
and outputs a random value s of length λ.
IDt ← INIT.ID(EDB, t ) : is a deterministic algorithm run by the
KMC to retrieve a set of ids from an ERTMS database. It
takes as input a database EDB and a ERTMS entity type t
and outputs the set of ids corresponding to t . In the current
ERTMS standard t ∈ {OBU ,RBC,EB}.
kmid,id ′ ← GEN.KMAC(id, id ′,knid c ) : is an algorithm run by
the KMC to generate a MAC derivation key. It takes as
input two ids id ∈ IDt and id ′ ∈ IDt ′ , and a secret knid c ,
and outputs the key kmid,id ′ that is used to authenticate
communication between id and id ′.
3.1 TRAKS Application Example
We present a high-level hierarchy of ERTMS Key Management
under TRAKS in Figure 3. Key management operations which
allow trains to operate across borders remain unchanged, with a
symmetric pair of keys shared between KMCs. From the current
ERTMS scheme, we introduce an intermediary level, leveraging
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NID C, denoted in Figure 3 by knid cx where x is the identity of the
region (NID C) of operation. NID C is an allocated ERTMS variable
that represents a specic region or line. is has a unique secret
key allocated per NID C, representing a mapping from NID C to its
line secret.
For a given region or line, a number of RBCs may operate. Using
the line secret knid cx , and the RBC identity, the RBC keys are
established. In the gure, we show two trains which are authorised
to operate over two NID C regions each. By applying Denition 3.1
and additionally supplying the identity of the train, the KMC al-
locates the keys required to the OBUs. For the RBCs, however, a
single derivation function is required to establish the keys.
More concretely, let us consider an example national domain
dened by Figure 3, with 4 NID C regions and 6 RBCs. For each
NID C in this domain, which have NID C values 1, 2, 3 and 4, the
Key Management Centre will generate a line secret (based on a
function which produces random output, e.g. using a Hardware
Security Module) for the regions. It stores the line secret output
knid c1, ...,knid c4. To provide RBC keys, the Key Management
Centre will use the line secret for the given NID C and compute
the individual key for that RBC by combining the ID of the RBC
and the line secret. We discuss the specics of generating keys in
Section 9. As an example, for RBC2 and RBC3, the Key Management
Centre will use the line secret for NID C2, knid c2, and compute the
individual RBC keys based on the IDs of RBC2 and RBC3 (i.e. rid2
and rid3), producing kmr id2,null and kmr id3,null , which would
then be installed on the RBCs.
When train keys are required, the KMC will determine for which
RBCs a key is required, and, for each of these RBCs, it will derive
the corresponding RBC key, and output a key which is the result of
applying the train ID to the RBC key using GEN.KMAC(rid,oid,
knid cx ). is results in a key which uniquely pairs a train to a
given RBC and can be installed on the train. When a train sends
the rst EuroRadio message, the RBC will use the ID of the train
to compute the key it requires using the key it has installed by
applying the train ID to the RBC key installed. As an example,
for Train1, with ID oid1, which operates in NID Cs 1 and 2, it will
receive all the necessary keys to communicate with the RBCs in that
area, i.e. kmr id1,oid1, kmr id2,oid1 and kmr id3,oid1 will be installed
on the train.
In the rest of this paper, we formalise the denition of this scheme
and prove its correctness, and discuss how it can be implemented
and used. In Section 5, we consider the security requirements and
aacker model that TRAKS must work with, before dening the key
lifecycle. We formally dene the current ERTMS key management
scheme in Section 4, presenting the TRAKS scheme in Section 5.
We apply these formal denitions in Section 6 to prove that the
current ERTMS Key Management scheme and proposed TRAKS
scheme are secure.
4 OFFLINE ERTMS KEY GENERATION
In this section, the Oine ERTMS key generation scheme that is
currently in use is presented in more detail.
e key provisioning process begins with the vendor (e.g. Siemens,
Alstom and Bombardier) of an entity (e.g. OBU) making a formal
request for an identity (ETCS ID), followed by a request for keys.


























Figure 3: TRAKS Key Hierarchy for ERTMS. TRAKS is com-
posed of four layers: (1) the national infrastructure for the
‘home domain’, which is responsible for liaising with for-
eign KMCs. (2) Geographic regions within a country, known
as NID C. (3) RBCs, responsible for command and control
messages to trains. (4) Trains, which operate across one or
more NID C regions.
e KMC then responds by issuing the two transport keys, kt1 and
kt2, used for authentication and encryption respectively. e two
keys are sent in the clear on portable media devices [19], to be
installed.
On successful installation of kt1 and kt2, the KMC will generate
unique keys for each train and RBC pair with identied through
their IDs oid and rid respectively. In order to authenticate messages
exchanged between them, each entity receives a collection of these
keys. We will denote the set of keys with which OBUs and RBCs
are provisioned as KM . KM may be initially empty (in the case
of a new train or RBC), but it keys will be added as the train is
authorised to communicate with relevant RBCs.
We provide an algorithm for theGEN.KMAC(id, id ′,knid c) func-
tion from Denition 3.1 in Algorithm 1. is algorithm takes as
input two IDs, id and id ′ corresponding to the two entities which
are authorised to communicate with one-another and returns a ran-
domly generated 3DES key to be used for message authentication
in the EuroRadio protocol. For example, the key between a train
with oid and an RBC with rid is: kmr id,oid ← SGen(1λ ).
Algorithm 1: Oine ERTMS key generation
Input: id, id ′
Output: kmid,id ′
1 function GEN.KMAC(id, id ′,null )
2 kmid,id ′ ← SGen(1λ )
3 return kmid,id ′
5 TRAKS - A UNIFIED ERTMS KEY
MANAGEMENT SCHEME
In this section we propose TRAKS, our ecient key generation
scheme for ERTMS. Our scheme uses the existing partitioning of
the rail network into individual zones of control, denoted by a
national identier, which is announced to the train by EuroBalises.
Using this partitioning, we enforce a permissions model which
ensures that trains are not able to operate outside their agreed areas
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of operation. TRAKS improves on the oine ERTMS scheme by
allowing the key generation to be dynamic for RBCs thus improving
the interoperability and reducing operational complexity for cross-
border operations, while maintaining static key provisioning to
trains. is provides maximum backwards compatibility with the
current standards and practices.
In addition to the reduced management overheads, our scheme
also provides authentication to messages both between OBUs and
RBCs, and between OBUs and EuroBalises (EBs) making it univer-
sally applicable to any rail entity.
5.1 Secret Generation
In the rail network for a given country, there will be one or more
regions. Each is identied through a public value, NID Ci for the
region with NID C value i . For each NID Ci , the KMC will generate
a random knid ci secret. As such, multiple secrets can be produced
by the KMC to partition the rail network into geographic zones,
and/or to establish trust between entity types, e.g. keys between
OBUs and RBCs are generated using knid c1 and keys between
OBUs and RBCs are generated using knid c2 for zone NID C1 and
NID C2 respectively’.
Similarly to the oine ERTMS scheme the TRACKS shared secret
is generated using:
knid ci ← SGen(1λ )
where SGen(1λ ) is a pseudo-random number generator (PRNG)
with the security parameter λ. Unlike the oine ERTMS scheme,
however, this secret is never given directly to OBUs or RBCs. It is
instead used together with IDs to generate the message authenti-
cation keys. is approach greatly enhances the usability of the
scheme by reducing the overall management overhead (i.e. secret
key material storage, distribution and disposal). In the following,
we will detail how we use this secret to generate the authentication
keys for each ERTMS entity.
5.2 Key Generation
Algorithm 2: TRAKS key generation
Input: id, id ′, s
Output: kmid,id ′
1 function GEN.KMAC(id, id ′, s )
/* for computing keys using s = knid c */
2 if id , null then
3 kmid,id ′ ← PRF (id, s );
4 if id ′ , null then
5 kmid,id ′ ← PRF (id ′,kmid,id ′ );
/* for computing OBU-RBC keys using
s = kmr id,null */
6 else if id = null then
7 kmid,id ′ ← PRF (id ′, s );
8 return kmid,id ′
Keys in TRAKS are generated using Algorithm 2, using knid c
and the IDs of the communicating ERTMS entities. Algorithm 2 can
be used to generate both (1) static keys which can be used to directly
authenticate messages between two entities with identities id , and
id ′ and (2) dynamic keys which can be combined by the holder
with any id ′ to derive a static key. We continue with concrete
descriptions of how keys are generated for OBUs, RBCs and EBs
using TRAKS.
OBUKeyGeneration. OBU keys are static keys which are entirely
computed by the KMC. Similarly to the oine ERTMS scheme,
when a train identied by ID oid is authorised to operate on a
specic line it is provisioned with a set of keys KM = {kmr id1,oid ,
kmr id2,oid , . . . ,kmr idn,oid }where rid1, . . . , ridn are the IDs of the
RBCs which control the line.
Each key kmr id i,oid is computed using GEN.KMAC(ridi,oid,
knid c ) detailed in Algorithm 2. First the secret knid c is combined
with the RBC’s ID ridi using a PRF to generate an intermediate
pseudo-random value (line 3). is intermediate value is subse-
quently combined using the same PRF function with the oid to
create the nal kmr id i,oid key (line 5).
e PRF can be any secure, non-malleable function, which is
proven secure against length-extension aacks, such as HMAC-
SHA-256 or AES-CMAC. It is easy to see that until now, our scheme
is fully backwards-compatible, as there are no changes to how the
keys are managed by the train.
RBC Key Generation. In TRAKS, keys that are provisioned to
RBCs are dynamic. is means that RBCs are able to produce
keys and communicate with any train for which they have an
OBU ID. Under the current ERTMS implementation, trains are
required to broadcast their oid in plaintext as part of the EuroRadio
handshake when communicating with a RBC. is enables TRAKS
to seamlessly replace the existing ERTMS scheme with only minor
modications to the RBCs internal programming.
Algorithm 2 is also used to generate RBC keys. Unlike in the
case of the trains where OBUs are provisioned with a set of keys,
the RBCs only have one key, kmr id,null , computed by running
GEN.KMAC(rid,null ,knid c ), where rid is the RBC’s own ID. e
value returned is the intermediate value computed in line 3.
RBCs can use kmr id,null by running GEN.KMAC(null ,oid,
kmr id,null ) for any broadcasted oid to compute the message au-
thentication key kmr id,oid .
It is easy to observe that generating key kmr id,oid based on
the knid c secret can be used to enforce the permissions model
explicitly. Any OBU and any RBC which are able to complete the
EuroRadio handshake protocol must have been explicitly approved
to operate in a given NID C, as opposed to the current scheme,
where this is implicit and therefore could be violated.
EuroBaliseKeyGeneration. Another signicant benet of TRAKS
is that it can be used without modications to generate authenti-
cation keys for any pair of ERTMS entities. Here, we will try to
exemplify this using EuroBalises (EB), however the scheme should
work with other, possibly not yet developed, rail entities. Currently,
EuroBalises oer no cryptographic protection of their payloads,
and are implicitly trusted by the train for accuracy and validity.
e process of generating the unique authentication keys for
balises is similar to the one used to generate the keys for the OBU-
RBC pairs.
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e KMC generates a balise specic shared secret as kbls ←
SGen(1λ ) which ensures that the shared keys between EBs and
OBUs are completely separate from the ones shared between OBUs
and RBCs and are generated by each the KMC responsible for
each country. However, unlike messages sent by trains or RBCs,
messages sent by EBs are xed. Furthermore EuroBalises are unable
to perform any cryptographic operations. As such, when using
TRAKS between OBUs and EBs, the balises will be provisioned
with their xed messages concatenated with the corresponding
MAC. e MAC will be computed using a static authentication
key generated by running GEN.KMAC(NID C,bдidi,kbls ) for each
balise group bдidi under the control of NID C. A balise group is a
collection of balises concentrated in a common geographical area,
for example, deployed along a rail line. We recommend the use
of groups of balises instead of single balises to ease deployment.
However, we note that the scheme would work similarly if balise
group IDs would be replaced with balise IDs. More details are
provided in Section 9.2.
Following key provisioning to a balise, the corresponding keys
for NID C, which are used for provisioning OBUs, can be computed
as follows:
kmNID C,null = GEN.KMAC(NID C,null ,kbls ).
is allows trains to use kmNID C,null to generate keys correspond-
ing to any balise group created using the key kbls and NID C by
computing kmNID C,bдid as:
kmNID C,bдid = GEN.KMAC(null ,bдid,kmNID C,null ).
6 SECURITY ANALYSIS
In this section, we formally discuss the security of ERTMS key
generation using a game-based approach.
We begin by stating that the aacker is given access to all IDs
that can be generated from EDB. e aacker wins if it is able to
generate a valid key kmid,id ′ for any pair (id, id ′) for the types
t and t ′, where id ∈ INIT.ID(EDB, t ) and id ′ ∈ INIT.ID(EDB, t ′).
We dene the ERTMS KMAC security with a game played between
a challenger C and an adversary A as follows.
Denition 6.1 (Key indistinguishably from random). Let KMAC =
(SGen, INIT.ID,GEN.KMAC) be a scheme over a database EDB
with security parameter λ, t and t ′ are entity types with t , t ′, and
b ∈ {0, 1}. We consider ExpbA (KMAC) (see Fig. 4), a probabilistic
experiment played between an adversary A and a challenger C
consisting of:
(1) Get IDs. C runs INIT.ID for types t and t ′ to generate the sets
ID and ID ′.
(2) Generate keys. C generates a new random secret s and uses it
to generate unique keys by running GEN.KMAC(id, id ′, s ) for
all pairs (id, id ′) ∈ ID × ID ′ except for (last (ID), last (ID ′)).
e function last (X ) returns the last element from a set X .
(3) Challenge. If b = 0 then the last key is generated as
kmlast (ID ),last (ID′) ← GEN.KMAC(last (ID), last (ID ′), s ).
If b = 1 then kmlast (ID ),last (ID′) is sampled randomly from
the keyspace K .
(4) Guess. A is given access to all the identiers in ID and ID ′
and to all the generated keys kmid,id ′ , where (id, id ′) ∈ ID ×
ExpbA (KMAC)
ID ← {i |i ∈ INIT.ID(EDB, t )}
ID ′ ← {i |i ∈ INIT.ID(EDB, t ′)}
s
R←− SGen(1λ )
for id ∈ ID, id ′ ∈ ID ′ do :
if (id, id ′) , (last (ID), last (ID ′)) :
kmid,id ′ ← GEN.KMAC(id, id ′, s )
endif
endfor
if b = 0 :
kmlast (ID ),last (ID′) ← GEN.KMAC(last (ID), last (ID ′), s )
else :
kmlast (ID ),last (ID′)
R←− K
endif
b ′ ← A
(
(kmid,id ′ )id ∈ID,id ′∈ID′ , ID, ID ′
)
return b ′
Figure 4: ERTMS key derivation security game for an adver-
sary A.
ID ′, and computes a guess b ′ ∈ {0, 1}. e output of the
experiment is b ′.
e advantage of an adversary A against the security of the
keys generated in ERTMS is dened as:
AdvA =
Pr[Exp0A (KMAC) = 1] − Pr[Exp1A (KMAC) = 1] 
e key is indistinguishable from random if the advantage is
negligible in λ.
In the following, we will show that both the current ERTMS
scheme KMACERTMS , and our proposed scheme KMACTRAKS ,
produce keys that are indistinguishable from random.
Key Indistinguishably for KMACERTMS . It is easy to observe
that the advantage of the adversary is based on its ability to dis-
tinguish the output produced by GEN.KMAC from random. How-
ever, the protocol specication (see Algorithm 1) shows that the
key kmid,id ′ for any pair (id, id ′) is already randomly sampled.
us, the advantage of A to distinguish kmid,id ′ from random,
|Pr[Exp0A (KMACERTMS ) = 1] − Pr[Exp1A (KMACERTMS ) = 1]|,
is negligible in λ.
Key Indistinguishably for KMACTRAKS . Based on the protocol
specication (presented in Algorithm 2) there are three cases for
GEN.KMAC.
Case 2. If two identiers id and id ′ are provided as inputs to
GEN.KMAC then the key kmid,id ′ is generated as follows:
(1) An intermediary key is generated by running the PRF with
the secret s and input id . As shown in Case 1, this is indis-
tinguishable from random.
(2) e previously generated intermediary key is used as a
secret in a second PRF run that also takes as input id ′. If the
PRF is secure then this output will also be indistinguishable
from random.
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Case 3. If identier id ′ is provided together with the secret
kmid,null as inputs to GEN.KMAC then the key kmid,id ′ is gener-
ated as in the Case 2.2 above, i.e. the value kmid,null is used as an
input, together with id ′ to a PRF. As kmid,null is indistinguishable
from random (see Case 1), if this PRF is also secure then the output
will be indistinguishable from random.
us, the advantage ofA to distinguish any kmid,id ′ for TRAKS,
|Pr[Exp0A (KMACTRAKS ) = 1] − Pr[Exp1A (KMACTRAKS ) = 1]|
will also be negligible in λ for any pair (id, id ′).
7 THE TRAKS KEY MANAGEMENT
LIFECYCLE
In this section, we outline the key lifecycle for TRAKS, beginning
with how the keys will be used and the changes required to support
TRAKS. We then look at other aspects, for example key revocation
and disposal of RBCs and trains.
Key Usage. Under our proposal, the RBC will be in an improved
position, whereby it does not require individual keys to be assigned
to it for a particular train. It is now able to derive its own symmetric
keys based on some public information broadcast by the train,
namely the ETCS ID. As a result, an RBC only requires a single key
to be installed on it, which it uses to derive the keys which will
correspond to those of the train. In the event that the RBC soware
does not support dynamic key generation, it may proceed using the
same set of keys that would be allocated to trains for that RBC ID.
Within the EuroRadio protocol, no changes are required to the core
protocol that takes place, other than the way that the lookup of the
key takes place. Currently, the RBC will use its ETCS ID and look
for a corresponding entry that pairs the RBC to the Train ETCS
ID and vice versa for the train. If an entry exists, it will use that
key, otherwise, the EuroRadio protocol will fail as no key could be
found. For our proposal, the RBC instead uses the kmr id,null key,
to derive the key which it can then use to compute a symmetric
session key for the MAC authentication in EuroRadio.
For the train, when keys are allocated, the KMC will look up
a set of the RBCs within the NID Cs specied as authorised, and
carry out the computation of kmr id,oid for each RBC. As with the
current scheme [19], the train will receive a set of keys, which, upon
the receipt of the the rst response message from the RBC in the
EuroRadio handshake (the AU2 message), can select the appropriate
kmr id,oid key to use.
Revocation. In this scheme, trains may have their keys revoked
using the ‘DELETE KEY’ command, issued by the KMC, and likewise
for the RBC. A blacklist, which would be made available for entities
to download during maintenance or stabling would inform the train
of RBCs it may no longer engage with, and vice versa for the RBC.
However, if there is cause to ‘reintroduce’ that particular ETCS ID,
there is no solution but either to generate a new knid c , which is an
intensive process to rekey all existing entities, or change the ETCS
ID of the aected entity. is, however, should be considered a very
rare event. Validity of keys would be governed under the validity
of knid c , ensuring that keys are refreshed on a regular, enforced
basis. In the event that a train or RBC are to be reintroduced, a new
ETCS ID should be introduced, as we consider all keys issued to the
original ID to be compromised and should not be eligible for reuse.
Disposal and End-of-Life. Keys should have a set lifetime, which
is subject to further discussion and scoping. However, at the end
of a key’s validity, a ‘DELETE KEY’ command should be issued to
the entity to remove the key, and a conrmation received that
the key has been deleted. At the point of end-of-life, in order to
prevent cryptographic material being leaked, a ‘DELETE ALL KEYS’
command should be issued by the KMC, where the entity conrms
receipt of the command, prior to deleting its kt keys. During this
process, the KMC should retain a copy of the keys, but mark them
as invalid, to prevent any keys pertaining to that entity from being
issued. If the entity operates across borders, the appropriate Key
Management Authorities responsible for cross-border keys should
be requested to initiate their appropriate ‘DELETE ALL KEYS’ com-
mand. Aer this point, the entity in question may be disposed
of.
7.1 Discussion
e solution presented in this section has been engineered to be
backwards-compatible, such that infrastructure managers may im-
mediately begin to shi to this alternative solution with no changes
to the internal way in which EuroRadio operates. All changes here
may be performed in soware, with most of the code changes lying
on the Key Management Centre and RBC interfaces.
at said, our solution can work in both oine and online situa-
tions, where in the oine mode, the RBC requires one initialisation
and installation of its derivation and kt keys, compared to a visit
by an engineer each time a train is introduced to the network and
requires ‘approval’ to communicate with this particular RBC. For
trains, however, the keys at the point of manufacture may be in-
stalled at the same time, whilst updates may take place whilst the
train is stabled and undergoing maintenance. If a train were to be
‘moved’ and made operational in a dierent geographic region3,
then the blacklist for the ‘previous’ RBCs should be updated to
contain that train unless it was going to continue operating in that
region. Likewise, a ‘DELETE ALL KEYS’ command should be issued
if the train will no longer operate in a given area.
In the online method, when an RBC comes online for the rst
time and has carried out the appropriate TLS handshake and client
authentication with the KMC, the KMC will simply issue the deriva-
tion key and appropriate constraints, as set out in SUBSET-038
[17]. For a new train, however, the process simply is an online
version of the oine system, where instead of physical media being
used, an online connection is used. Overall, this solution provides
the additional protection that if the Key Management Centre went
oine, the entities still retain sucient keying material to carry
out the EuroRadio Handshake. A train should not be allowed to
make a journey for which it does not have the appropriate keying
material to proceed. is prevents a situation where the GSM con-
nection between the train and RBC is instead redirected to an RBC
in another area, where an unsafe instruction may be issued.
We should also consider the case of existing trains which are
currently operational. Under the existing oine model, each train
has a unique key shared with the appropriate RBC on its ‘allowed
routes’. is provides an challenging operational concept, where
3For example, the West Midlands franchise in the United Kingdom is likely to receive
17 of the former Northern franchise British Rail Class 323 electrical multiple units.
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during the process of national deployment, the line secret may be
set up and appropriate derivation keys established. is means that
as RBCs are introduced, no additional keys need to be introduced to
trains, and they may immediately be in a position to communicate
with the RBC. However, once a national deployment is complete,
the process of adding additional keys is expensive, and there are
few storage benets to having few keys. us, the KMC may be
able to ‘precompute’ the keys for the train, where the RBC is still
required to carry out the appropriate calculations.
For existing lines and entities, their keys will remain valid until
the validity period expires, in which course, a replacement key will
be issued based on this specication.
Identied changes to the EuroRadio Protocol (in soware) and
underlying infrastructure are:
• Modication of the way that an RBC looks up keys: it will
not perform a lookup, rather it will simply carry out the
appropriate key generation computation (as per Algorithm
2) for the key that will allow it to communicate with the
train. Trains will continue to be statically keyed, with no
changes required.
• Establishing ‘line secrets’ that correspond to a specic
NID C and appropriately generating kmr id,oid keys for
RBCs and trains based on this principle.
8 KEY DISTRIBUTION
In the current ERTMS distribution scheme, the transport key is
issued by the KMC in the clear, with a requirement on the inter-
mediary to use trusted media (ranging from CD to USB storage).
During national deployment, there will be a signicant number of
transport keys being issued, with the risk that multiple transport
key payloads will be stored on the same media4. As the transport
key is installed in the clear, an aacker could intercept the transport
keys at the point of installation.
Once the aacker has the transport keys, they are able to inter-
cept the encrypted keys from the Key Management Centre when
they are installed on the train or RBC. For a train, this means that
the aacker can determine the session key with relative ease if they
observe the EuroRadio handshake protocol between the train and
an RBC. In the case of an RBC, however, this means that an aacker
could initiate arbitrary EuroRadio sessions with valid MACs, or
even worse, send arbitrary messages to a train with a valid MAC,
once the nonces have been obtained which the train would accept.
e current scheme is not secure due to this threat, and we propose
a new key distribution scheme as follows:
Manufacture/Commissioning. e train/RBC creates its own
pair of transport keys, kt1 and kt2, using a hardware security mod-
ule, exported using a pair of symmetric keys, kv1 and kv2, burnt
into the module by the vendor or operator to encrypt and MAC
the payload containing the transport keys and the ERTMS identity
of the train or RBC. We place a requirement that the vendor has
a secure supply chain and the keys are securely generated and
handled. If the vendor keys are compromised, new trusted keys
would need to be installed onto every train/RBC from that vendor
through their update mechanism.
4e RBC and OBU selects a specic le from the media for its payloads, typically
bound using its ETCS ID[19].
Key Requesting from Infrastructure Manager. e vendor/op-
erator generates a request to the national infrastructure manager
(KMC) for the appropriate keys to be installed, providing the trans-
port keys generated by the train or RBC. is request is encrypted
and MACed with a pair of symmetric keys issued by the KMC to
the ‘approved’ vendor or operator, kv,kmc1 and kv,kmc2. As a ven-
dor may be responsible for manufacturing trains and RBCs for use
in dierent countries, they determine the appropriate countries
that keys are required for and submit requests to the appropriate
infrastructure managers.
KMC Processes Request. e KMC veries the request, as per
nationally agreed procedures and, if valid, generates the appropriate
kmr id,oid keys as required, encrypted and accompanied by a MAC
using the transport keys given and stored as part of the request.
e scheme accounts for two cases, dynamic key generation ability
and static key usage. For each case:
• Ability to dynamically generate keys. e Key Man-
agement Centre computes a ‘master derivation key’, i.e.
kmr id,null as per Algorithm 2, with no additional identity
parameter included. It then encrypts and generates a MAC
using the transport keys, before issuing the result to the
vendor/operator.
• Static key usage. e Key Management Centre identies
the keys required, and generates a set of keys based on
the NID Cs provided in the request. is is done through re-
peated runs of Algorithm 2, with the appropriatekmr id,null
for the set of RBCs located in the appropriate NID C that
the train requires keys to authenticate to them. ese keys
are encrypted then MACed using the transport keys, prior
to issuing them to the vendor/operator.
Key Installation. e vendor/operator then installs the payload
of km keys onto the train/RBC where it will verify the MAC and
decrypt the keys before installing/performing the maintenance in-
struction as required. As part of this, the train or RBC will generate
a response to conrm the keys are installed, “KEYS INSTALLED”,
which includes a hash of the database of keys installed on that
entity, and encrypts then MACs the response with the transport
keys shared between the train/RBC and KMC.
Vendor Commissioning Conrmation. e vendor/operator
provides the response to the KMC which veries it using the trans-
port keys and compares its local key database hash (corresponding
to the train/RBC) to ensure that it matches the one in the response.
If there is a mismatch, the protocol will require the issuance of keys
to take place again.
We provide an example issuance protocol for a new train under
the TRAKS scheme in Figure 5.
8.1 Considerations
In TRAKS, revocation is considered to be an exceptionally rare
event, compared to the regular revocation process we see in public-
key revocation with certicates. In the event that a key becomes
compromised on a train, the infrastructure manager would be re-
quired to allocate a new ETCS ID to the train in question and provide
new keys. For an RBC, the same process would take place, where
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Train Vendor KMC
kt1,kt2 ← SGen(1λ)
enc(oidt | |kt1 | |kt2,kv1) | | MAC(enc(oidt | |kt1 | |kt2,kv1),kv2)
Generate KMAC-REQ request for oidt
enc(KMAC-REQoidt | |kt1 | |kt2),kv,kmc1) | |
MAC(enc(KMAC-REQoidt | |kt1 | |kt2),kv,kmc2))
Process KMAC-REQ from Vendor.
kmr idi,oidt ← GEN.KMAC(oidt ,kmr idi,null ),
for every relevant RBC i
enc(((rid1,kmr id1,oidt ), … , (ridn,kmr idn,oidt )),kt1) | |
MAC(enc(((rid1,kmr id1,oidt ), … , (ridn,kmr idn,oidt )),kt1),kt2)
enc(((rid1,kmr id1,oidt ), … , (ridn,kmr idn,oidt )),kt1) | |
MAC(enc(((rid1,kmr id1,oidt ), … , (ridn,kmr idn,oidt )),kt1),kt2)
enc(“KEYS INSTALLED”| |Key DB HASH,kt1) | |
MAC(enc(“KEYS INSTALLED”| |Key DB HASH),kt1),kt2)
enc(“KEYS INSTALLED”| |Key DB HASH,kt1) | |
MAC(enc(“KEYS INSTALLED”| |Key DB HASH),kt1),kt2)
Figure 5: TRAKS Key Issuance Protocol for a new train t . e train is responsible for generating its own transport keys before
encrypting and calculating a MAC using keys kv1 and kv2 respectively. e payload is submitted to the vendor as part of the
key request to the KMC. e KMC processes the request, generating the necessary keys, where they are then installed on the
train. e train is required to submit a checksum of the key database to ensure that the keys held on the train/RBC match
what the KMC asserts should be installed. A similar process is run for new RBCs, as described in Section 8.
an engineer interacting with the aected unit is an acceptable over-
head. at said, the current ERTMS specication and guidance from
National Standards Bodies, for example RSSB [14] does not recom-
mend quantitatively how long keys should be valid for, beyond ‘the
most time the key is required’. As part of TRAKS, we recommend a
regular rekeying interval to prevent aacks, such as those presented
in [4]. Rekeying can be performed during maintenance intervals,
with trains at depots to ensure safe installation of keying material.
We do not see the blacklist, maintained and distributed by the KMC,
to impose considerable burdens on infrastructure managers and
train owners.
For RBCs, which are already connected to a network to allow
intercommunication with other RBCs, it may be possible to move
the RBCs to communicate with the KMC online, and at regular
intervals, whereas for trains, the maintenance would happen oine
at the depot.
9 APPLICATIONS OF TRAKS IN A SECURE
ARCHITECTURE
In this section, we present applications where TRAKS may be used
and the considerations when implementing the scheme. We demon-
strate how TRAKS may be used in EuroRadio, before showing
how EuroBalises, which are trusted for location and speed/track
prole data can be protected with a cryptographic MAC, before
highlighting other applications outside of ERTMS.
9.1 EuroRadio MAC Keying
In this subsection, we will discuss the implementation considera-
tions of the TRAKS scheme for the EuroRadio handshake protocol.
We require the use of a pseudo-random function, PRF , in the
TRAKS framework. For a National Infrastructure Manager, this
could be an HMAC function, such as HMAC-SHA-256, which is be-
lieved to be post-quantum secure. For key management operations,
where the keys are in transit, a similar keying mechanism should be
used between the KMC and approved organisations. For example
with vendors and train operators, to ensure that the security of the
keying material is never compromised. Given the current scheme
relies on 3DES keys, a subset of the 256-bit output can be used as
the 3DES key, until support for 256-bit keys is implemented.
We also recommend the use of a blacklist, which should be signed
or have an accompanying MAC which can be retrieved on a regular
basis, to ensure that, in the event of revocation, RBCs and trains do
not interact with possibly compromised infrastructure.
9.2 EuroBalise Payload Security
Currently, the data held on EuroBalises is protected with a CRC [21],
which allows an aacker to dene their own balise payload, in-
creasing line speeds or creating a ‘virtual’ block which overlays
two sets of balise groups (BGs). is data is trusted by the train to
be accurate and is used in position reports to the RBC, which in
turn is used for the safe supervision of the network.
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Generally, ‘read-o’ components are secure in providing broad-
cast information in plaintext when used in conjunction with a
veried component. However, when used as part of a trusted net-
work to make safety-critical decisions, it is not acceptable to have
only add a checksum to the data. is only provides error-detection
and does not defend against an aacker who is capable of either ma-
nipulating or emulating a balise, as they can be arbitrarily forged.
erefore, the payloads on the balises should be authenticated.
Balise payloads, with the exception of ETCS Level 1 deployments,
are static in data, which can therefore be signed or be accompanied
with a MAC. We use the TRAKS framework to dene a Key Man-
agement Scheme, which provides a ‘per-balise’ MAC Key, ensuring
that the compromise of one balise-specic key does not enable the
aacker to impersonate other balises in the network.
At the root of TRAKS, the Key Management Centre generates a
national balise secret, e.g. for Great Britain, kmGB , which is used
to generate all subkeys which are linked to the NID C of the line.
is produces kmNID C,bдid which is installed on all OBUs allowed
to operate within a given NID C. When the train passses over the
balise and reads the telegrams from it, it can derive the MAC Key
using the Balise Group ID, and verify the MAC. In the case the MAC
fails verication, a ‘violation’ is recorded, so that the infrastructure
manager can aend to the faulty balise. In the event that the train
is at fault, recording erroneous ‘violations’, it is expected that issue
is referred to the vendor for reactive maintenance.
Under this scheme, we add the requirement that all OBU units
must have a trusted execution environment installed, for example
Intel SGX and ARM TrustZone. is is necessary to prevent that
the set of kmNID C,bдid keys can be extracted from the OBU and to
ensure only authorised cryptographic operations can be performed
using the keys. Balises do not have the kmNID C,bдid key installed
on them at any time - the key is made available to the encoding
units during maintenance periods, with the balise only containing
the (plaintext, MAC) payload. No changes are required to the balise,
as it does not carry out any computation.
While balise keys are always derived and never stored on any
system, balise-specic keys provide defence in depth. is ensures
that the compromise of one balise MAC does not compromise other
balises, as the MAC key is specic to that particular balise. It should
be noted, however, that EuroBalises can still be moved.
An alternative solution would be to implement a protocol where
the train and balises are able to communicate in which MAC are
computed in real-time. However, when considering the speed con-
siderations at which balises are read, in excess of 300km/h, where
three ‘telegrams’ from the balise group must be successfully read,
implementing such a protocol would be dicult and an interactive
authentication protocol would be infeasible. erefore, providing a
static payload with a MAC is far more ecient and less prone to
errors in transmission. Assuming reading an unauthenticated/CRC-
encoded 1023-bit balise message takes t milliseconds to read and
process (e.g. 1.81ms for a train running at 500km/h, with no read
failures, average conditions and data rates), adding TRAKS authen-
tication would only increase this time by 6%. is eectively means
that the impact is 1.92ms or 26.6cm by the time the train has read,
derived the balise MAC key, and validated the MAC, which can be
further mitigated with beer hardware. at said, the benets are
considerable with minimal cost in time.
Currently, the CRC as well as other data used in integrity veri-
cation uses 110 bits of the total balise payload. If we replace this
data with a 128-bit MAC, the available balise payload is reduced
by only 18 bits. For the majority of balises ,this should not pose a
problem, as Packet 44, used to send non-ERTMS messages from a
balise to the train, is dened by the infrastructure manager, and
typically will not ll all 1023 bits of balise payload.
9.3 ICS PLC Environments
e TRAKS framework may also be applied to other ICS environ-
ments, where a number of programmable logic controllers (PLC)
devices in ICS/SCADA environments may communicate with each
other and the communication protocol is not protected. is is, for
example, the case with MODBUS/PROFIBUS. is lack of protec-
tion allows an aacker to carry out a man-in-the-middle aack and
aect the operation of the system, potentially puing it into an
unsafe situation.
A simple solution to this aack vector is to apply MACs to each
message sent by a PLC. However, for an ICS owner, puing one key
across the network achieves lile security, where the keys could
be extracted. erefore, a partitioning of the system would allow
specic ‘zones’ of control to be drawn, analogous to the NID C
variable that is used in ERTMS to dene regions and lines. With
this, a centralised key could be dened per zone and installed onto
the appropriate hardware. A derivation step is then included on
the controllers which would allow a per-device key to be used in
the actual communications.
10 CONCLUSION
In this paper, we have presented a new key management solution
which may be applied to a number of industrial control system en-
vironments. Using proven cryptographic techniques, we achieve an
interoperable, backwards-compatible solution that can be used in
ERTMS. It reduces management overheads for National Infrastruc-
ture Managers, and delivers post-quantum security. is scheme
has further applications beyond EuroRadio, including EuroBalises,
to ensure safety through security. By applying a partitioned system
principle to ERTMS, we have been able to develop a key distri-
bution scheme which maintains the same level of security in the
system, whilst delivering signicant benets to the ICS owners and
operators.
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